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Summary findings
Quantitative  studies of civil war have focused either on  whatever the degree of ethnolinguistic fractio lalization
war's onset or its termination, producing important  in a society.
insights into these end points of the process. Elbadawi  *  This effect is amplified in polarized socie  :ies. The
and Sambanis complement these studies by studying how  probability of civil war is lower in very homogeneous
much war we are likely to observe in any given period.  societies and (less so) in more diverse societie .
To answer this question, they combine recent advances  *  In polarized societies the risk of civil war can be
in the theory of civil war initiation and duration and  reduced by political rather than economic libcralization.
develop the concept of war incidence, denoting the  At high levels of political freedom, ethnic divc  rsity-even
probability of observing an event of civil war in any  polarization-has  a minimal impact on the risk of civil
given period. They test theories of war initiation and  war.
duration against this new concept using a five-year panel  * Economic diversification that would reduice  a
data set for 161 countries. Their analysis of the incidence  country's reliance on primary exports would also reduce
of war corroborates  most of the results of earlier studies,  the risk of civil wars, especially in polarized societies.
enriching those results by highlighting the significance of  *  In strategies for preventing civil war, pol tical
sociopolitical variables as determinants of the risk of civil  liberalization should be a higher priority than economic
war. Their findings:  development, but the best possible results wo.ild
* Steps toward advancing political liberalization or  combine political reform, economic diversification, and
economic development reduce the risk of civil war,  poverty reduction.
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Formal and quantitative analyses of civil wars have recently identified a  set of
important socio-economic  determinants  of the onset (initiation) and duration of civil war.
To date, the most  extensive such studies are Collier and  Hoeffler (2000), Sambanis
(2001), Hegre et al. (1999); and Fearon and Laitin (2000;  1999);  who identify the
determinants of the onset of civil war; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (1999), who
analyze the socio-economic determinants of war duration; and Mason and Fett (1996),
Licklider (1995), and Doyle and Sambanis  (2000) who focus on the political determinants
of civil war termination and post-conflict peacebuilding. These studies use a variety of
models and data-sets and focus on different periods, generating a wealth of insights into
the correlates  of civil war.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the study of the causes of civil war by
developing the idea of incidence of civil war and identifying its determinants. We define
the probability of incidence of civil war at any given time (t) as a probability of two
disjoint events.  The first event is that war happens at time (t), having been initiated for
the first time (i.e. there was no war at time (t-1)).  The second event is that war is
observed at time (t), having been initiated at an earlier period.  Thus, the probability of
incidence of civil war is equal to  the probability of war onset or initiation plus the
probability that a war will last more than one period.  The concept of war incidence
therefore is equivalent to the concept of the overall amount of civil war that one might
observe in a five-year period (say).  Developing this concept rather than the concepts of
war onset and war duration separately  unifies the two strands of inquiry that researchers
have followed and allows us to address an important policy question: What determines
the risk of civil war for a given country  at any given point in time?
To  answer this question, we depart from a  synthesis of the theoretical model
developed in Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (1999).
That synthesis provides us with a model which we test against a new panel data-set of
161 countries.  We use a  random effects panel probit estimator to  identify the key
economic and political variables that influence war incidence.  Our main concern is to
Iexplore in greater depth some of the original results of the studies mentioned above.  [n
particular,  we  want  to  identify  the  impact  of  ethno-linguistic  and  religio  ls
fractionalization  on the probability  of violent conflict.
Our paper also addresses some technical concerns with the empirical estimations
that may arise out of potential path dependence of the concept of war incidence.  We
consider that some of the important  explanatory variables may be potentially endogenous
to war outcomes or to ethnic fragmentation and we test for such a relationship before
making inferences using the most robust and generalizable  empirical results.
We find that the net effect of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  on the incidence of
civil war is an  additive sum of its influence on war onset and war duration.  Ethnic
fractionalization is  positively, robustly,  and  non-monotonically associated with  the
probability of war incidence. At the same time, we find that a quadratic interaction term
of religious and ethnic diversity is negatively associated with the incidence of civil war.
These two effects merge the empirical results of Collier et al. with respect to both war
onset and war duration.  Further, we are able to establish the importance of the lack of
political rights as permissive causes of war incidence.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a detailed summary of the
theory of war onset and war duration, summarizing  the earlier work of Collier and his
associates. This review explains the theoretical  propositions and empirical results that we
test later in our paper with reference to war incidence.  Section 3 describes the data-s,;t
and  proxy variables  and discusses some interesting summary statistics.  Section 4
presents the findings of our empirical analysis. Here we also discuss specification issues,
including tests of the potential endogeneity  of some key explanatory  variables. Section 5
presents simple simulations based on our empirical model to see how the probability of
war incidence changes in response to variations in the level of ethnic fractionalizationi,
economic development, political rights, and natural resources.  We conclude with  a
discussion of the policy implications of this analysis  and suggestions  for further research.
22.  The Incidence of Civil War: Analytical  Framework
The probability of an incident of a civil war at time t (P(w,))  can be expressed as
the sum of two probabilities:
(1) P(w,) = P(W, r) w, lC)  + P(w,  m  w,_ 1),
where the first right-hand side term is the joint probability of the event of war at time t,
provided that time t- 1 was peaceful (i.e. w'  is the event that there is no war (or there is
peace)); and the second term indicates the probability of war in time t, provided that it
was initiated at time t-1 or earlier (i.e. probability that the duration of war at time t is at
least one period long).  The latter event suggests that the event of the war in time t is a
continuation of an event that has started at least one  period earlier.  The theory of
incidence of war then is a combined theory of initiation and duration of war.  To the
extent that the two events are derived by two different and non-overlapping processes
(Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 1999) the determinants of the incidence of war at any
given time will be determined by the joint set of the determinants of both events. Thus,
before we explore the determinants  of war incidence, we must refer to the theory of and
empirical findings on war onset and duration, as developed by Paul Collier et al.
2.1  The Collier-Hoeffler  Model of the Onset of Civil War
Collier (1998; 1999) and Collier and Hoeffler (1999a; 1999b) developed the first
economic model  explaining the  onset of  civil wars and  distinguished between two
possible motives for civil war: "justice-seeking"  and "loot-seeking."
The Loot-Seeking Rebellion. The authors theorize that civil wars often occur as a
result of actors' desire for private gain (loot or greed). Looting can take place after rebel
victory or during the fighting. Examples of "loot-seeking" rebellions abound -consider,
for example, the Angolan and Colombian rebellions, which have been economically
viable for the rebels despite little prospects of military victory.  The presence of  a
"lootable" resource base creates the motive for such rebellions.  The realization of the
rebellion itself depends positively on the availability  of "rebel labor" (i.e. the number and
opportunity costs of potential rebels) and negatively on the "government defense labor"
3(i.e. the government's military strength). Thus, Collier and Hoeffler (1999b) model the
risk  of the  onset of  civil war  as proportional to the  interaction between rebel  anld
govermment  labor.
Looting is  also characterized by  economies of  scale.  Because loot-seeking
rebellion aims at private gains and control of natural resources, the resource-endowme  nt
and its geographic concentration help determine the size of the rebel group.  The size of
the group will also be determined  by diminishing returns to rebellion, with given levels of
natural resources and given sizes of the government and rebel armies.  The equilibrium
risk of  war  onset  is therefore determined by  equating the marginal product of  the
government and rebel labor to their respective marginal costs for a given level of natural
resources.  Thus, the authors argue that the risk of civil war initiation increases as the
natural resource endowment increases and decreases as the opportunity cost of rebellion
increases.
The "Justice-Seeking" Rebellion.  Rebellions may also be caused by grievance
and may aim at achieving  justice.  The demand  versus the supply of justice determine the
conditions for the onset of "justice-seeking" rebellions.  Collier and Hoeffler (1999,
2000) identify three types of grievance which potentially increase the demand for justice.
First, social fractionalization or the presence of a  large number of unemployed and
uneducated young men could reduce the opportunity cost of rebellion. Second, political
repression and third, economic dysfunction (slow economic growth; high inflation; high
income or asset inequality)  would also decrease the opportunity  cost of rebellion.
The supply of justice is determined  by the cost of achieving  justice.  This, in turn,
is determined by the opportunity  cost of rebel labor and it is constrained by the collective
action problems associated with providing  justice (which is a public good).'  To resolve
these collective action problems, one needs significant social capital or a vanguard of
' Three types of collective action problems are identified  by Collier and Hoeffler  (1999b). The first, is
a free-rider  problem due to the non-excludability  of the consumption  of justice. The second, is due to the
fact that justice-seeking rebellions are characterized  by increasing  returns to scale at the industry level.
Thus, the authors argue that rebellion  creates a coordination  problem: "everyone  may be willing to join a
rebellion, but only if sufficient  others do so for their participation  to be productive." The third is a problem
of time consistency, because  justice-seeking rebellion  reaps rewards only upon victory. The authors also
explain ways to resolve the collective  action problems in justice-seeking  rebellions.
4committed rebel sympathizers, whose decision to join the rebel movement encourages
others to participate in rebellion.  Collective action problems become magnified as the
level of social fragmentation  increases and the probability of incurring punitive costs for
rebellion increases.
The Determinants of the Onset of Civil War:  Collier and Hoeffier's theoretical
model suggests that there are several interacting influences on the probability of war
onset.  Some factors increase the demand for justice, increasing the probability of civil
war. But the demand-side influences on justice-seeking war may be offset by the costs of
supplying justice,  e.g., by political repression and the likelihood of  punishment for
rebellion. Variables such as the level of ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  may increase the
demand for justice but make the coordination of a rebellion harder. Thus, the net effect
of some of these factors on the probability  of civil war onset is ambiguous  (ex ante). This
is  especially true for pure "justice-seeking" rebellions, so the authors conclude that
"rebellions may be either pure loot-seeking, or have both motivations" since these types
of rebellions can overcome collective  action problems.
Collier (1999) shows that in  "loot-seeking" civil wars for a given size of the
government army, there exists a threshold for the size of the rebel army, below which the
rebel movement risks "getting squashed."  Hence, loot-seeking rebel movements must
overcome an "entry threshold" before they can successfully  wage a civil war.  The author
identifies three ways of surmounting this threshold.  First, the movement may resort to
small-scale criminal activities to facilitate its growth into a wider-scale natural resource-
looting movement. Second, the movement may depend on external assistance to "pump-
prime" into a viable insurgency. Third, the movement could champion grievances as a
start-up tool.  Collier argues that, while grievances in this case would be conveniently
exploited as a matter of discourse, the rebellion would ultimately be sustained by the
presence of profitable predation.  Collier (p. 8) thus concludes that "The existence of
entry thresholds for loot-motivated  rebellion is somewhat analogous to the existence of
the free-rider problem for grievance-motivated  rebellions: each is a major barrier.  This
suggests that grievance and greed may have a symbiotic relationship in rebellion: to get
started rebellion needs grievance,  whereas to be sustained it needs greed."
5To test their theory empirically, Collier and Hoeffler (1999) identified a  set of
measurable variables that  could be  used as  proxies for the  economic and  political
determinants of civil war.  They estimated a probit model using a panel data-set of If2
countries.  Their data-set was organized in five-year panels, covering the period 1960-
1994 and combining political variables from the Correlates of War project and econom c
variables from the Summers and Heston PWT 5.6 data-set.  They explicitly focused cn
war initiation  or onset (P(w,  r  1 :  C))w  Their binary dependent variable "war" was set
equal to 1 if a war was initiated during any 5-year period and 0 if no war occurred. They
dropped  all  observations of  ongoing  war.  They then  regressed war  initiation on
education, primary exports as a share of GDP (and their square), a squared interaction
term between religious and ethno-liguistic fractionalization,  a democracy index and its
square, and the natural log of population size. These variables were selected to proxy the
theoretical model discussed  above.
Their  empirical  results  supported  most  of  their  model's  key  predictions:
Educational attainment was found to  significantly prevent civil wars, as it raises the
opportunity costs of political violence. Natural resource-dependence  (proxied by primary
exports as percent of GDP) was significantly and non-monotonically  associated with the
probability of war onset, lending strong support to the loot-seeking model.  The justice-
seeking model  was also  supported by  the  evidence, specifically by  the  significant
negative effect of ethnic and religious fractionalization on the likelihood of civil war
onset.  The positive but less than unitary elasticity for the effect of population has the
important implication that while the risk of war increases with the size of population, o-n
average  larger countries are safer than  small ones.  The results  on the  effects  ef
fractionalization  and  population  have  important policy  implications:  dividing  up)
countries with  diverse societies into smaller and more homogenous countries would
actually increase the overall risk of war.
A surprising result of Collier and Hoeffler's estimations is that they fail to fin,1
any  significant effect  for political repression, which contradicts evidence from  the
political science literature (e.g., Hegre et al. 1999). Moreover, compared to the economic
determinants of the loot-seeking model, the evidence on the effect of fractionalization  is
6less robust.  We look closer into these two issues in our empirical analysis of section 4,
which explores the question of the determinants of the overall incidence of civil war.
Before we proceed to the analysis of war incidence,  however, we must summarize  recent
results with reference to the duration of civil war.
2.2  The Collier-Hoeffler-Soderbom  Model of Duration of Civil Wars
Expanding the theory of the onset of civil war, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom
(1999) found that onset and duration are qualitatively different processes.  Specifically,
ethno-linguistic fractionalization,  which is not significant as a cause of war (if entered
independently in the equation) is the only highly significant determinant of war duration.
Moreover, it has a non-monotonic effect: while homogenous or diverse societies tend to
experience short wars, polarized societies-consistent  with having two or three ethnic
groups-tend  to suffer prolonged wars.  They explain this effect as follows: once the
rebellion starts, its  duration depends on the capacity of the rebels to  stay together.
During the course of the war, the government will try to divide-up the rebel movements
and win over some factions to its side.  In homogenous societies, rebel cohesion is likely
to be  more vulnerable to  such government attempts, given the lack of  strong socio-
cultural or religious divide between the two camps.  Moreover, for the case of diverse
societies, maintaining the unity of a movement composed of diverse groups is likely to
become harder over time.  This leaves the case of polarized societies, for which rebellion
can be  sustained for a longer period.  The authors also simulated the probability of
duration and find that there is a high probability that a civil war will end during its first
year. However, should the war continue beyond the first year, the probability of peace is
radically lower for subsequent years. 2
These important new insights into the determinants  of war onset and war duration
can be combined in an analysis of the overall incidence  or amount of civil war, which can
2 They explain this as a consequence  of  "the systematic over-optimism  of rebels which would be
predicted by random errors in estimates of the costs and benefits of rebellion. Many wars are mistakes,
which do not produce rebel victory but rather military stalemate. Stalemates can be ended by negotiated
settlements,  but these encounter a time-consistency  problem, with the government  being unable credibly  to
7be modeled as the sum of the probabilities of onset and duration of war. In section 4, wN  e
test this framework empirically. In the next section, we describe the data used in ouz
analysis.
3.  Our Data
To test our models of the incidence of civil war, we use a new cross-sectional
time-series (panel) data set with five-year frequency  covering the period 1960-1999. The
data set includes economic, social, and political variables for 161 countries as well as data
on war-related variables for those countries that experienced  war. Our coding of civil war
events represents a synthesis of the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small 1994 ,
the Uppsala University data-set (1997), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and the State-Failure
project (1997), as well as other sources. 3
We classify a violent conflict as a civil war if the following conditions apply: 4
(a) The war caused  more than 1,000  thousand deaths;'
(b) The war challenged  the sovereignty  of an internationally  recognized state;
(c) The war occurred  within the territory of that state;
commit  to settlement terms. As a result, military stalemates  persist" (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom, 1999,
17).
3 Detailed description of the coding of all variables, including  country-specific  comments on the start-
end dates of each war and other pertinent information  may be downloaded, along with the data, at:
http:\\www.worldbank.org\research\conflict\....  [to be posted online at the time of publication]
4 This definition is widely used; see, for example, Licklider  (1995). Sources for coding war incidence
include: Singer and Small (1994); Uppsala University  project on civil wars and Journal of Peace Studies
annual data-sets on armed conflict  (various years); The State Failure Project (1995); Licklider  (1995;
1993); Mason and Fett (1996); Regan (1996); Walyer  (1997) SIPRI yearbooks (1987-1998); secondary
texts, including case-studies and official reports, such as: LeMarchand  (1987); Callahan  (1997); Doyle,
Orr, and Johnstone (1997); Rotberg (1998); Deng (1999); Stuart-Fox (1998); Sambanis (1999). Human
Rights Watch reports on Sierra Leone; The Democratic  Republic of the Congo; Uganda; Kosovo; Bosnia;
Algeria. State Department reports on Bangladesh; Laos; Burma; Chad; Djibouti; Egypt; Cambodia;
Guinea-Bissau;  Peru; Philippines.  Other sources: CIA World Factbook (various years); World Almanac;
Sivard (1991); Armand (1995).
5  Most of these conflicts have produced 1,000  deaths annually and this is the threshold used to classif."
a conflict as a civil war in the Singer and Small (1994) and Uppsala University  projects. However, the
codebook of the ICPSR study which includes the international  and civil war data files does not mention ar
annual death threshold (rather, this is mentioned in Singer and Small 1982)  and no annual death data are
available from the Correlates of War project. Thus, our civil wars classification  includes a small number of
conflicts that have produced more  than 1,000 deaths  over the duration of the war, but not necessarily on an
annual basis for the duration of the war. The variable DATASET  denotes such cases as follows: if
8(d) The state was one of the principal  combatants;
(e) The rebels were able to mount an organized  military opposition to the state;
(f) Combatants were concerned with the possibility of living together under the
same political unit after the end of the war.
We code our dependent variable AT_WAR  to study the overall incidence of civil
war.  AT_WAR equals 1 for all observations during which the war was ongoing and 0
otherwise.  We collected data on a number of variables, which we used in this paper as
proxies for our empirical tests.  We briefly describe these variables below (variable
names are given in parentheses).
We proxy opportunity cost of rebel labor by the per capita real income level
(RGDP). 6 Other possible proxies for opportunity cost include education levels (both
primary  and  secondary schooling), degree  of  urbanization, life  expectancy, infant
mortality, and other such variables.  Political rights can be proxied by the openness of
political institutions (POLITY), which is the average of an index of democracy (DEM)
minus an index of autocracy (AUTO).'  We proxy the level of ethnic diversity by two
different measures: first, with the index of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (ELF), which
was measured in the 1960s and ranged from 0 (ethnic homogeneity) to  100 (extreme
ethnic heterogeneity); 8 and second, with an index of ethnic heterogeneity (EHET) which
is the sum of indices of racial division, linguistic  division, and religious division, created
by  Vanhanen  (1999)  and  ranging  from  0  (lowest heterogeneity) to  144  (highest
heterogeneity). 9 We proxy natural resource-dependence  by primary exports as a percent
DATASET  is greater  than  or equal  to 3, then  an annual  death  toll  of 1,000  deaths  or more  can be assumed;
if DATASET  is less than 3, then annual deaths may fall below 1,000  for part of the war's duration.
6  Various sources were used, which cause some problems with the comparability  of GDP data.
Missing values are imputed from World  Bank data on GDP at market values  (measured at current US $)
and GDP per capita for 1960 and 1985 (World Bank data).
' The source is the Polity98 data-set. DEM is the democracy  index (from I to 10, with 10 being the
highest). AUTO is the autocracy index (from I to 10,  with 10  being the highest). POL is the democracy
index minus the autocracy index and ranges from -10 (lowest rights) to 10 (highest rights).
The ELF index was created  by Taylor and Hudson (1972); see also Mauro 1995).
The EHET index was created by Vanhanen  (1999). This is measure reflects a more inclusive
definition  of ethnicity based on a combination of racial, linguistic,  and religious differences.
9of GDP (PRIMX).' 0 We also measure the size of the country by the natural log of its
population (LOGPOP).
3.1  Some Global Patterns on the Incidence of Civil Wars
The global percentage of countries that experienced  a civil war rose steadily fromn
7% in  1960-64 to a  staggering 28% in  1990-94, which witnessed the collapse of tLe
former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (see Figure 1).  However, the global
incidence of civil wars declined sharply in the following five years, with only 13% of the
world affected by civil wars.  However, at the close of the 2U"  century the world is less
safe than 40 years earlier.  Except for three periods (1970-74, 1985-89, 1995-99) more
than half of the civil wars were fresh wars, started within the period.  Moreover, the end
of the Cold War also marked the highest rate of new wars during the past 40 years.
Our indicators of social fractionalization  (ELF, EHET) are not time-varying and
population size and the share of primary exports remain relatively stable over time.  The
pivotal indicators of economic and political development (RGDP and POLITY) have
improved considerably over time (see Table 1).  Mean income per capita more than
doubled from about $2,153 in 1960-64 to reach about $4,593 in 1995-99.  Moreover,
political rights improved from low average of -0.2 in the early 1960s to more than 3 in
the second half of 1990s. This evidence appears to be inconsistent with the rising risk of
civil wars in the world.  However, average behavior masks the considerable diversity in
terms of  the  incidence of wars  as well  as the progress in  economic and  political
development.  This is evident by the high and rising dispersion (standard deviations)
around these  average indicators.  Indeed,  in terms  of the risk of civil wars  some regiors
have  become  a  lot  safer  because  they  achieved  considerable  economic  and  political
development  over  the  last 40 years.  Other  regions,  however,  have  lagged  behind  and,
therefore, have become more vulnerable  to risks of civil wars (see Figure 2).
'° In a future version of this study  we plan to measure the unemployment  rate for males at the
beginning of each five-year period (UNEMPL)  to proxy the economic  opportunity  costs of rebellion for
potential rebels (we use the male unemployment  rate since rebels are typically males).
104.  Estimating the Incidence (Amount)  of War
In this section, we test the predictions of the literature reviewed in section 2 in the
context of an overall incidence  model. The incidence  of a civil war (coded: AT-WAR) is
a sum of the two disjoint events of a new war (WAR-ST) and a war that started at an
earlier date (War_DUR). We test three hypotheses:
That  all  economic and  political  factors as  well  social fractionalization are
robustly associated with the incidence of civil wars at a given point in time;
Social fractionalization (especially when there is combined ethnic and religious
fractionalization)  reduces incidence  through its effect on the onset of new wars;
Ethnic  fractionalization has  an  additional influence on  incidence of  wars-
operating through its  effect on duration-where  its positively and non-monotonically
associated with the risk of incidence.
We estimate an encompassing incidence model, which accounts for the above
three hypothesis (hereafter the Elbadawi-Sambanis (ES) model).  Our inferences are
based on regression results using a random-effects  panel probit estimator (by contrast,
Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 2000) estimate the probability of war onset using a pooled
probit model)."  Our choice of estimator is based on evidence of significant random
effects' 2 in all our regressions  (see reported results on the rho coefficient in Table 2).  Our
dependent variable, AT_WAR, is coded 1 if there is a war and 0 otherwise. Except for-
the social fractionalization variables (as well as population size)-which  are assumed
exogenous-all  other economic  and political variables are lagged. This is consistent with
the  specification of  the  probability of  incidence as  the  sum  of  two  probabilities
conditional on information  at time t- 1.
The regressors include three sets of variables. The first set of variables measures
economic  grievance  and  interest  and  includes  once-lagged real  per  capita  GDP
" Collier and Hoeffler (2000) do try one specification  of a random effects model but they do not use
that model as the basis for their inferences.
12 In the event that random effects  are significant,  simple pooled panel probit models produce biased
estimates (e.g., Greene, 1997).
11(RGDPLAG); once-lagged  growth rate of per capita GDP (YGL  1); once-lagged share of
primary exports as percent of GDP (PRIMXLAG)  and its square (PRIMXLAG2).' 3
The second set of variables measures political grievance and  include a  once-
lagged index of political rights (POLL1) and its square (POLL12).  We also lag this
variable twice (POLL2) to test the significance  of a lack of political rights as a permissive
-not  a proximate-cause  of violent conflict (as a permissive cause, POLL2 would take
longer to have an impact on the probability of an incident of civil war).  Further, the
impact of civil war on the polity of a country is severe, so two lags would reduce the
likelihood of reverse causality in this relationship. We also include the square of polity
(POLL12) to  account for a possible non-monotonic relationship between democracy
levels and civil war over a long period.  It is argued  that civil war is less likely in either
perfect democracy or extreme repression (though for different reasons) and that the risk
of war rises with imperfect democracy  or lesser degrees  of repression  (Hegre et al., 1999).
The third set  of variables measures social influences on violent conflict and
includes an index of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (ELF) and its square (ELF2), which
is alternatively measured by an index of ethnic heterogeneity (EHET) and its square
(EHET2); and, following Collier and Hoeffler (1998) a quadratic interaction term of
ethnic and religious fractionalization  (ELF2RF2) and the natural log of population size
(LOGPOP).
4.1  Testing for Endogeneity  in the ES Model
Recent literature suggest that both economic  and political variables may, at least
partially, be influenced  by the extent of social fractionalization  (e.g., Easterly and Levine,
1997; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Collier, 1999; Collier and Binswanger, 1999;
Rodrik, 2000).  Therefore, both the incidence of civil wars as well as the economic and
political variables associated with it may be driven by the same processes-which,  in
tum, depend on social diversity.  Rivers and Vuong (1988) provide a  solution to the
"  Data for primary exports per capita are very scant. So as not to lose too many observations due to
the inclusion  of this variable, we have imputed missing values  of the variable using data on other variables
which are highly correlated with primary exports, specifically,  overall  trade figures and manufactures
exports as percent of total merchandise  exports.
12potential  endogeneity of  continuous right-hand-side variables  in  binary  dependent
variable (probit) models, using cross-sectional  data.  They provide a test for endogeneity
as  well as  a  formula for  computing the correct standard errors of the  endogenous
variables.  Extending Rivers and Vuong framework to panel data, we estimate a panel
data two-stage probit model of the following  form:
(2) Y,l  = z;ji  +  if  ,1,
(3) P(wj,  ) = Xj 51  + Y,,,l '2  + u j,
(4) E(uj,Yj,_,)  # O,
where i = 1,...n (number of countries) and t =  1,..., k (number of periods);  and P(w) is the
probability of incidence of civil war;  Yj,  l  represents the set of lagged economic and
political (potentially) endogenous explanatory variables; X, is the set of time-invariant
(or  semi-time  invariant) exogenous  explanatory variables  (social  fractionalization
variables and population size); and  Z,, is a vector of instruments, which includes the
exogenous variables  in  the  structural equation (3)  a  well  as  (higher-order) lagged
dependent and endogenous variables  (for r < t - 2 ).  The probit model of equation 3
includes time varying right-hand side variables in one-period lagged, rather than current,
form.  This specification directly follows from the probability statement of equation 1,
which specifies the probability of incidence of war as a sum of two probabilities, given
information at time t-1.  However,  potential endogeneity  of at least some of these lagged
political and economic variables (as suggested by equation 4) should not be ruled out.
These lagged variables will be endogenous if, for example, the disturbance terms of
structural equation (3) are serially correlated  (i.e. u;, = p  ui,l +  Si,  ).
We estimate equation 2 (in our case, using random effect regression),' 4 obtaining
fitted values for each potentially endogenous variable, and then construct a vector Ck, 1
of the predicted residuals of those variables.  The second stage involves estimating the
13following panel probit model, which includes all exogenous and potentially endogenous
variables along with vector of the residuals:
(5) P(w,,) = XW  + Yl82 +  C6'3  +6,e.
For each potentially endogenous variable y,,  the null hypothesis of exogeneity
can be tested by a simple t-test of the coefficient of the auxiliary variable 6i . Moreover,
even if the test suggests  that the variable in question is endogenous (i.e. the t-statistic is
significant)  the estimated coefficient corresponding  to y, in the equation is unbiased.  In
case  of  endogeneity, however, corresponding standard errors and  t-statistic for  the
endogenous variable will be incorrect. Standard  inference  remains valid for all other non-
endogenous variables.  For variables found to be endogenous, correct inference in this
model would require estimation of a complicated variance-covariance  parameter or by
simulating consistent large sample standard  errors by bootstrapping  methods.
Regression 1 of Table 2 estimates the panel probit model of equation 5 above,
using the residuals from the panel regressions equivalent of equation 2.  The results of
equation 2 (the first stage regressions)  are reported in Appendixl. Based on the statistical
significance of the coefficients of the R variables of regression 1, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity  in all cases except for POLL1.  Based on this test we used
Plp, the fitted value of POLLI, in regressions 2-5, and estimated consistent and efficient
standard  errors for P1  p using bootstrap  techniques."'
"4  We selected this over a fixed effects (fe) model because  fe models dropped  the ELF and ELF2
variables from the estimation, reducing  the number  of exogenous  variables in the equation.
'5 The bootstrapping technique (developed by Efron 1979, 1982) can be used to estimate coefficients
and standard errors and works as follows:  N observations  are randomly drawn with replacement  from my
data-set one thousand times. The random draws are based on a random number. This process generates the
distributions  of statistics of interest (in this case the coefficient  and standard errors of partition and the
other explanatory variables in our model). Based on these distributions,  we computed the means and
standard deviations of these statistics.
144.2  Testing the Hypotheses  of the ES Model
We base our inferences on regressions 2-8.16 We adopt the principal of 'moving
from  general to  specific,'  where  we  start from  regression 2  and  sequentially drop
insignificant terms in subsequent regressions.  Regression 4 is the most parsimonious
model, where only robustly significant  variables are kept in the regression. In regressions
5 and 6, Plp  (instrumented  POLL1) is replaced with POLL2; and in regressions 7 and 8
ELF is replaced by EHT.
Overall, our results confirm the three pivotal hypotheses stated above, which
corroborates  our specification  of the probability  of the incidence  of civil war as a function
of economic, political and social fractionalization  variables.  Moreover, we confirm the
hypothesis that the set of these variables is an additive sum of the determinants of two
disjoint events: that war has just started at time t;  or that it started at time t-1 or earlier.
In  particular, social fractionalization has two  different and  statistically significantly
different channels: one corroborating the theory of onset of civil war and the other
corroborating the theory of duration.  Therefore, these results should be interpreted as
lending strong support to both theories.
A brief description of the specific results follows.  However, before we proceed
we need to draw an important  distinction  between regressions 1-6 and 7-8. The first set is
based on he assumption that social fractionalization  is characterized  by orthogonal ethno-
cultural (ELF) and religious (RF) diversities.  In this case, the combined effect of both
types  of  fractionalization is  represented by  a  covariate term  (ELFxRF).  Instead,
regressions 6-7 assume that the  two types fractionalization are  complimentary, and
therefore,  the  aggregate  effective  is  represented by  an  additive  index  of  ethnic
16 The  panel  probit  regressions  2-8  (of Table  2) simultaneously  account  for significant  country-specific
random  effects  as well  as potential  endogeneity  of some  explanatory  variables.  These  regressions,
therefore,  can be regarded  as "statistically-correct"  (Hendry,  198$)  and  are  therefore  adequate  for testing
the theory  of hazard  of civil  war  as well  undertaking  simulations  on the relative  influences  of various
determinants.
I5heterogeneity (EHET)."'  Our analysis focuses on the first set, the main results remain
robust regardless of the definition adopted,  however.
For the remainder if this section we describe four main findings suggested by the
results of Table 2.
First, unlike Collier-Hoeffler  who fail to find robust association between political
rights and war initiation, we find that low political rights (Plp)  are significantly aad
negatively correlated with the incidence of war.  This relationship persists even when we
lag our variable twice (POLL2, in regressions 5-6) to test if political repression operates
as a permissive cause of civil war. Our results suggest that the demand for justice, which
increases the risk of war, dominate the negative influence of increased cost of supplying
justice.  However, we find that the quadratic term (POLL12) is  highly insignificant
(regressions 1 and 2)18  and was, therefore, dropped in  subsequent regressions.  Our
results, therefore, do not support a significant  non-monotonic  effect for political rights on
the incidence war (regressions  2) as predicted  by the political science literature (Hegre et
al., 1999).
Second, the risk of incidence of civil war is robustly and negatively associaled
with  initial  levels  of  economic development (RGDPLAG) and  economic  grovwth
(YGLAG), less robustly.  This  finding lends strong support to  the Collier-Hoeffler
economic theory of civil war.  Further, we find that primary exports as a percent of G]P
(PRIMXLAG) have a positive, significant,  though non-monotonic association to the nsk
of civil war. Again, this corroborates  the results of the earlier literature. The presence of
natural resources (proxied by primary exports) seems to provide easily "lootable" assets
for  "loot-seeking"  rebels  or  convenient  sources  of  support  of  "justice-seeking"
movements (Collier 1999). However, beyond a certain range natural resources become a
formidable instrument in the hands of govermments,  which can use them to fund armies,
buy popular support, and compensate  external allies (though this non-monotonic effec: is
'7 The EHET index is more inclusive  than ELF, it reflects social conditions  in the 1980s and 1990s and
is available for many more countries  than ELF.
1  A likelihood ratio test of the model restricted to exclude POLL  12 could not reject the null hypothesis
of no-significance  of POLL12  with a chi2(1) = 0.02 and Prob > chi2 = 0,8752.
16not  as  robust as the  initially positive relationship between primary exports and  the
incidence of civil war).
Third,  our  results  corroborate the  duration of  civil  wars literature  (Collier,
Hoeffler and  Soderbom, 1999) in that ethnic diversity and the risk of  incidence of
incidence  of  civil  war  were  positively  and  non-monotonically associated.  This
relationship is  highly significant and  robust,  regardless of  the  definition of  social
fractionalization adopted  (regressions 2-8).  This  result  suggests that,  like  ethnic
homogeneity, ethnic diversity actually reduces rather than increases the risk of incidence
of war. The negative, and robust, association between  the probability of incidence of civil
war and the quadratic covariate term (ELFxRF) suggests that when religious and ethnic
fractionalization are orthogonal, diverse societies can be even safer than homogeneous
societies (regressions 2-6).  This latter finding lends support  to Collier-Hoeffler  theory of
onset of civil war, which emphasizes the interpretation  of social fractionalization  as part
of the cost of "collective action" in justice-seeking rebellions.  Therefore, other things
equal, social fractionalization  is associated with high incidence of civil war only when it
borders polarization (when each of the largest two groups accounts for 60-40% of the
population).
Finally, our  results suggests that population size  is  positively  and  robustly
associated with the risk of civil war.  Therefore, countries with smaller population size,
individually, face lower risk of war.  However, a region composed of smaller countries
(such as Sub-Saharan Africa)  face a higher risk. This is because, the risk of war does not
increase proportionately  with population size (Collier and Hoeffler, 1  999b).
With these results at hand, we can now answer an important policy question: how
effective is economic development  as compared to political liberalization in reducing the
risk of civil war under different underlying socio-cultural conditions?  We turn to this
question next.
5.  Conclusion: How Much Can the Risk of Civil Wars be Reduced?
We have found that, when we shift our attention from the discrete events of war
initiation and war duration and we consider the determinants of overall incidence of civil
17war, political variables are important in influencing  the probability of observing a war
event.  This paper has suggested that, for policymakers interested in reducing the overall
amount of war, a better understanding of the concept of civil war incidence is necessarY
and we have outlined some of the important determinants  of war incidence globally. Our
empirical model can be used to assess the relative impact of political rights, improved
living standards and diversified economies on the risk of civil war.  In the rest of this
paper,  in  lieu  of  summarizing the  results just  described, we  will  use  our  most
parsimonious regression-regression  4 in Table 2-  to simulate the partial effects of the
three core determinants  of war incidents and this will allow us to explain how we may go
about reducing the overall amount of civil war in the world.
In Table 3, we conducted some simple simulations using regression 4 by varying
the three core variables while holding all other variables constant at their sample median
levels (Figures 3-5 also display the same information). Table 3 and Figures 3-5 reveal a
number of important conclusions. First, achievements  in either political liberalization, or
economic development would reduce the risk of civil war regardless of the degree cf
ethno-linguistic fractionalization in  a  society.  Second, this  effect  is  amplified in
polarized societies, since very  homogeneous and,  to  a  lesser  extent, more  diverse
societies have very lower probabilities of civil war (see Figures 4 and 5, especially i.
Third, a greater reduction in the risk of civil war in polarized societies can be achieved by
political rather than economic liberalization (compare the difference between the two
lines in each of Figures 3 and 4).  At very high levels of political freedom, ethnic
diversity-even  polarization-has  a minimal impact on the risk of civil war (see Figure
3).  Fourth, economic diversification that would reduce a country's reliance on primary
exports would also reduce the risk of civil wars, especially in polarized countries (Figure
5).
These results also suggest a strategy for preventing future civil wars that would
prioritize political liberalization rather than economic development.  Clearly the best
possible results would be achieved by a combined improvement on all fronts: political
reform, economic diversification  and poverty reduction. However, with the often-limited
capacity in the type of countries that are likely to be vulnerable to civil wars, the start
18may have to be based on one rather than three fronts.  It can be argued that, for three
reasons, this should be the political arena.  First, to significantly reduce the risk of civil
wars via economic achievements very high standards of living or substantial degree of
economic diversification will be required.  Again, given the initial conditions in these
countries, this may take long time to achieve.  Second, due to a multiplicity of factors
(demonstration effects, globalization, etc.) the pace of political reforms toward better
governance and improved political rights could be accelerated. Third, in socially diverse
societies such achievement at the political front is a prerequisite for stable economic
growth (e.g., Rodrik, 1998,  2000; Collier 1999b).
Further directions for this research should include refinements  and expansions in
the data-set used in our study and the studies of Collier and Hoeffler  (2000) and others, as
well as attempts to distinguish between the causes of different types of civil war (e.g.,
ethnic and revolutionary  civil wars).
Finally, the technical and policy benefits as well as shortcomings of our concept
of war incidence should be weighed against research designs that distinguish between war
initiation and war duration and the results from these two types of research designs
should be compared and contrasted for consistency.  The most significant divergence  in
the policy implications of the two research designs lies in the role of political institutions:
do inclusive, flexible, and representative political institutions reduce the risk of civil war
by reducing political grievance?  Does war itself corrupt such institutions in post-war
periods?  Is  political  openness a  function of  economic variables  and,  hence, less
significant than poverty alleviation and economic modernization with respect to their
potential to reduce the risk of civil war?  Our research design would suggest that political
variables are important and that they should be carefully integrated in any framework
designed to better understand  the causes of civil war.  In that respect, our findings invite
further comparisons  with the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2000). In further research,
we  plan to  explore further the channels through which  political variables may be
important and examine if it is possible to integrate our results with those of the other
major studies referenced in this paper.
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21Table 1: Summary Statistics  by Five-Year Period
(Number  of Observations,  Minimum  and  Maximum  Values  are for  the entire  period,  1960-1999)
Variable:  Ethno-
At  War  Polity  Real  GDP  Prim. Religious  ling  Ethnic  Population
War  Start  Index  GDP  Growth  Exports  Divers.  diversity Diversity  Iog
Observations  1252  1144  1054  1061  767  1237  932  1000  1264  1 268
Minimum
(1960-1999)  0  0  -10  56  -.107  -.0459  0  0  0  10.621
Maximum
(1960-1999)  1  1  10  33946  .108  2.139  79.05  93  177  20.908
Means & Standard Deviations
1960-1999  .170  .091  -.15  3713  .0156  .175  35.74  41.92  44.15  15.35
Mean & s.d.  (.375)  (.288)  (7.53)  (4076.4)  (.0311)  (.161)  (24.39)  (29.69)  (35.96)  (1.91)
1960-1964  .070  .070  -.17  2152.9  .0211  .172  35.31  41.92  44.15  14.98
Mean &  s.d.  (.257)  (.257)  (7.40)  (2154.3)  (.026)  (.026)  (24.52)  (29.79)  (36.06)  (1 938)
1965-1969  .141  .101  -.85  2589.8  .0249  .174  35.31  41.92  44.15  1:.09
Mean & s.d.  (.350)  (.302)  (7.42)  (2592.4)  (.0224)  (.161)  (24.52)  (29.79)  (36.06)  (I 92)
1970-1974  .141  .063  -1.77  3073.4  .0235  .172  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.20
Mean &  s.d.  (.350)  (.244)  (7.34)  (2990.6)  (.0326)  (.160)  (24.52)  (29.79)  (36.06)  (1  91)
1975-1979  . 174  .098  -1.80  3596.2  .0221  .196  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.31
Mean & s.d.  (.380)  (.299)  (7.54)  (3427.4)  (.0311)  (.206)  (24.52)  29.79  (36.06)  (1 90)
1980-1984  .193  .107  -1.31  4642.2  -.0053  .210  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.40
Mean & s.d.  (.396)  (.310)  (7.63)  (5317.2)  (.032)  (.237)  (24.52)  29.79  (36.06)  (1 89)
1985-1989  .224  .083  -.630  4336.8  .00916  .163  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.51
Mean &  s.d.  (.418)  (.277)  (7.72)  (4389.4)  (.0286)  (.128)  (24.52)  29.79  (36.06)  (I 89)
1990-1994  .281  .166  1.99  4583  ---  .155  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.62
Mean &  s.d.  (.451)  (.374)  (7.05)  (4816)  (.134)  (24.52)  29.79  (36.06)  (I 89)
1995-1999  .130  .047  3.08  4592.2  ---  .160  35.31  41.92  44.15  15.69
Mean & s.d.  (.337)  (.213)  (6.76)  (4810.6)  (.136)  (24.52)  29.79  (36.06)  (1.89)
22Table 2: Random Effects Probit Models of the Incidence  of Civil War in Five-year Panels
Coefficients  and Standard Errors (in parentheses);
*** significant at .01; ** significant  at .05; * significant  at .10
Explanatory  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8
Variables:
constant  -22.91***  -20.70***  -20.63***  -21.04***  -20.46***  -22.61***  -16.112***  -13.69***
(3.56)  (3.46)  (3.49)  (3.03)  (3.16)  (3.70)  (2.835)  (3.12)
PRIMXLAG  12.08*  8.140*  7.92*  7.976**  7.471  8.169**  5.996*  4.57
(primary exports)  (6.93)  (4.57)  (4.73)  (3.37)  (4.861)  (3.282)  (3.51)  (3.58)
PRIMXLAG2  -16.79  -12.14  -11.85  -16.59**  -11.087  -15.54**  -10.29  -8.41
(isxp squared)  (13.19)  (8.680)  (9.09)  (6.77)  (10.17)  (6.49)  (6.87)  (7.13)
RGDPLAG  -.00025***  -.00022***  -.00022***  -.00019***  -.00023***  -.00019***  -.00019***  -.00013**
(Real GDP, PPP)  (.00009)  (.00008)  (.00008)  (.00007)  (.00007)  (.00007)  (.00007)  (.00006)
YGLI (Real per cap  -22.21  -10.29**  -10.08*  -8.370  -8.79**  -6.76*
GDP growth rate)  (17.11)  (5.264)  (5.73)  ---  (6.26)  ---  (3.83)  (3.664)
POLLI  -.098***
(Polity index)  (.0353)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Plp (POLLI fitted/  -.107***  -.1066***  -.1062***  -.093**
Instrumented)  ---  (.035)  (.0359)  (.0289)  ---  ---  (.030)  ---
POLL12  .0022  .00077
(Polity squared)  (.0068)  (.0048)  ---  ---  ---  ---
POLL2  -.088***  -.089***  -.0524*
(Polity lagged twice)  ---  ---  ---  ---  (.027)  (.022)  ---  (.0293)
LOGPOP (Log  of  1.09***  .9833***  .979***  .996***  .979***  1.094***  .850***  .6792*
population size)  (.174)  (.169)  (.169)  (.156)  (.164)  (.1950)  (.158)  (.1708)
ELF (ethnolinguistic .1748***  .1623***  .1619***  .1553***  .1519***  .1508***
Diversity)  (.0378)  (.0381)  (.0401)  (.028)  (.0308)  (.0269)  ---  ---
ELF2  -.0015***  -.00142***  -.0014***  -.0013***  -.0013***  -.0013***
(ELF squared)  (.00039)  (.00037)  (.00039)  (.00028)  (.0003)  (.0003)  ---  ---
ELF2RF2  (ELF  *  -5.80e-08***  -5.84e-08**  -5.74e-08**  -5.89e-08**  -4.48e-08*  -3.58e-08
religious diversity)  (2.24e-08)  (2.42e-08)  (2.44e-08)  (2.50e-08)  (2.62e-08)  (2.27e-08)  ---  ---
EHET  .036***  .0421**
(diversity index)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ...  (.013)  (.0212)
EHET2  -.0002**  -.00024*
(EHET squared)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  (.0001)  (.00014)
ResPip  -.138***
(POLLI residual)  (.0513)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
ResPlp2  .0059
(POLL  12 residual)  (.0082)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
ResPly  -.00007
(RGDP residual)  (00030)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
ResPIg  -12.629
(YGLI residual)  (17.202)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ------  ---
ResPIx  5.804
PRIMXLAG  residual  (7.909)  ---  ---  ---  - ---  ---  ---
ResPlx2  -6.772
PRIMXLAG2  residual  (15.822)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Rho  .899***  .892***  .891***  .890***  .886***  .893***  .876***  .783***
(Corr. Coeff.)  (.028)  (.034)  (.035)  (.027)  (.030)  (.026)  (.035)  (.065)
Observations:  500  500  500  516  512  535  500  561
Log-likelihood:  -168.147  -170.772  -170.784  -180.594  -176.27  -184.805  -173.734  -191.368
23Table 3: Probability of an Incident in Civil War at Variable Levels of Political  Rights, Real Income,
and Primary Export Dependence  in Ethno-linguistically  Homogeneous,  Polarized,  and
Heterogeneous  Countries.
(One Variable Changes; Rest are Set at their Sample Median)
Level of  Medians of Quartiles of  Quartile  Probability of an
Ethno-linguistic  Polity, RGDP &  Values  of  incident of civil war
Fractionalization  PRIMELAG  Variable  In a 5-year Period
Bottom 10% POLL2  -9  .00016311
VERY  Median POLL2  -5  .00002926
Top 10% POLL2  10  9.935e-09
Bottom 10% RGDP  923  .00006707
HOMOGENEOUS  Median  RGDP  1941  .00002926
Top 10% RGDP  4644  2.686e-06
Median 1"  Bottom 10% PRIMEXAG  .034  1.957e-06
Quartile ELF  Median  PRIMEXAG  .159  .00002926
Top 10% PRIMEXAG  .333  .0000254
Bottom 10%  POLL2  -9  .45577208
VERY  Median  POLL2  -5  .29588664
Top 10% POLL2  10  .01655767
Bottom 10%  RGDP  923  .36832686
POLARIZED  Median  RGDP  1941  .29588664
Top 10%  RGDP  4644  .14292801
Median 2nd & 3rd  Bottom 10%  PRIMEXAG  .034  .12850299
ELF Quartiles  Median PRIMEXAG  .159  .29588664
Top 10%  PRIMEXAG  .333  .28452882
Bottom 10% POLL2  -9  .01707874
VERY  Median POLL2  -5  .00548921
Top 10%  POLL2  10  .00001753
Bottom 10% RGDP  923  .00955432
HETEROGENEOUS  Median RGDP  1941  .00548921
Top 10% RGDP  4644  .00105473
Median 4th  Bottom 10% PRIMEXAG  .034  .00084297
Quartile ELF  Median PRIMEXAG  .159  .00548921
Top 10% PRIMEXAG  .333  .00498949
24Figure 3: Probability of Civil War at Low/High Levels of Political Rights
and Variable Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
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25Figure 5: Probability  of Civil War  at Low/High Levels of Economic Diversification
(Measured as Level of Natural Resource-Dependence)
and Variable Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
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26Appendix 1: First-Stage Regressions  for Two-Stage  Probit Model (Model 1, Table 2)
** Note:  isxp is the sane  as PRIMXLAG;  isxp 2 is the same as PRIMXLAG2.
*  Model  1 --  expanded/general  model  w/ exogeneity  tests
*  Stage  1 regressions  --  include  in appendix
xtreg  polll  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll
2 poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rf2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  516
Group  variable  (i) : id  Number  of groups  =  110
R-sq:  within  =  0.1048  Obs per  group:  min  =  1
between  = 0.9660  avg =  4.7
overall  =  0.8426  max  =  5
Random  effects  u_i  - Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  2697.98
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0 (assumed)  Prob  >  chi2  0.0000
polll  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>IZI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
rgdpl2  1  .0001229  .0000559  2.200  0.028  .0000134  .0002325
ygl2  1  .288755  4.826611  0.060  0.952  -9.171228  9.748738
poll2  1  .829857  .022217  37.352  0.000  .7863124  .8734015
poll2s  1  .0094295  .0050355  1.873  0.061  -.00044  .019299
geoper  I  .0437343  .0176337  2.480  0.013  .0091728  .0782958
isxpll  1  2.685052  3.090068  0.869  0.385  -3.371371  8.741475
isxp2ll  1  -7.001812  4.620386  -1.515  0.130  -16.0576  2.053978
elf  I  -.0034412  .0212057  -0.162  0.871  -.0450035  .0381211
elf2  1  .0001347  .0002736  0.492  0.622  -.0004015  .000671
elf2rf2  I  -4.28e-08  2.29e-08  -1.865  0.062  -8.78e-08  2.17e-09
logpop  I  -.0154961  .1203178  -0.129  0.898  -.2513146  .2203224
-cons  I  -1.639858  2.08143  -0.788  0.431  -5.719385  2.439669
--------- +------------------------------------------------__-----------------_
sigma  u  I  0
sigma  e  1  2.6861206
rho  I  0  (fraction  of variance  due  to u_i)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------_
. predict  Plp
(option xb assumed;  fitted values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen  ResPlp  =  Plp-polll
(772 missing  values  generated)
. xtreg  polll2  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll2  poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rf2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  516
Group  variable  (i)  : id  Number  of groups  5  110
R-sq:  within  =  0.1067  Obs  per  group: min  1
between  =  0.9306  avg  - 4.7
overall  =  0.7182  max =  5
Random  effects  u_i  Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  =  1284.65
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0  (assumed)  Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
po1112  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
rgdpl2  i  .0011477  .000306  3.750  0.000  .0005479  .0017475
ygl2  1  16.76263  26.43255  0.634  0.526  -35.04422  68.56947
27poll2  1  .1667502  .1216697  1.371  0.171  -.0717181  .4052185
poll2s  1  .7227519  .0275768  26.209  0.000  .6687024  .7768014
geoper  I  -.0314098  .0965698  -0.325  0.745  -.2206831  .1578634
isxpll  11.88033  16.92251  0.702  0.483  -21.28719  45.04785
isxp2ll  1  -24.02909  25.30318  -0.950  0.342  -73.62241  25.56423
elf  I  -.1733159  .1161311  -1.492  0.136  -.4009286  .0542968
elf2  1  .001199  .0014983  0.800  0.424  -.0017377  .0041357
elf2rf2  I  8.20e-08  1.26e-07  0.652  0.514  -1.64e-07  3.28e-07
logpop  -1.013059  .6589109  -1.537  0.124  -2.3045  .278383
-cons  1  32.5331  11.39878  2.854  0.004  10.19189  54.87431
sigma  u  1  0
sigma_e  1  15.69877
rho  I  0  (fraction  of variance  due  to u_i)
. predict  Plp2
(option xb assumed;  fitted values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen ResPlp2  =  Plp2-polll2
(772 missing  values  generated)
. xtreg  rgdplag  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll2  poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rl2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  516
Group  variable  (i) : id  Number  of groups  =  110
R-sq:  within  = 0.8627  Obs  per  group: min  =  1
between  =  0.9499  avg =  4.7
overall  = 0.9611  max  =  5
Random  effects  u_i  - Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  4690.17
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0  (assumed)  Prob >  chi2  =  0.0000
rgdplag  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>lzI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
rgdpl2  1  .8339643  .0165481  50.396  0.000  .8015306  .866398
ygl2  1  12379.11  813.0732  15.225  0.000  10785.52  13972.71
poll2  13.75505  6.453581  2.131  0.033  1.106259  26.40383
poll2s  1  1.532974  1.224424  1.252  0.211  -.8668526  3.932802
geoper  1  45.71224  8.554909  5.343  0.000  28.94492  62.47955
isxpll  I  -2008.443  735.7265  -2.730  0.006  -3450.44  -566.4451
isxp2ll  I  5875.138  986.1306  5.958  0.000  3942.357  7807.918
elf  1  9.561358  11.84629  0.807  0.420  -13.65695  32.77966
elf2  -.2020015  .1520272  -1.329  0.184  -.4999694  .0959665
elf2rf2  1  .0000146  .0000126  1.157  0.247  -.0000101  .0000394
logpop  I  -51.11993  59.28777  -0.862  0.389  -167.3218  65.08196
-cons  627.0077  942.0352  0.666  0.506  -1219.347  2473.363
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
sigma_u  1  725.17089
sigma  e  1  403.69156
rho  I  .76341829  (fraction  of variance  due  to u_i)
. predict  Ply
(option xb assumed;  fitted values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen  ResPly  =  Ply  -rgdplag
(772 missing  values  generated)
. xtreg  ygll  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll2  poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rf2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  500
Group  variable  (i) : id  Number  of groups  =  110
R-sq:  within  =  0.0112  Obs per  group:  min  =  1
28between  =  0.4813  avg =  4.5
overall  =  0.1709  max  =  5
Random  effects  ui  - Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  =  90.23
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0  (assumed)  Prob  > chi2  =  0.0000
ygll  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
…--------+…___________________________________________________________________
rgdpl2  1  -2.29e-06  5.05e-07  -4.535  0.000  -3.28e-06  -1.30e-06
ygl2  I  .1764172  .044013  4.008  0.000  .0901533  .2626811
po112  .0005054  .0002028  2.492  0.013  .0001079  .0009029
poll2s  I  3.46e-06  .0000456  0.076  0.940  -.000086  .0000929
geoper  I  .0007822  .0001606  4.869  0.000  .0004674  .0010971
isxpll  -.0044191  .0281565  -0.157  0.875  -.0596047  .0507665
isxp2ll  I  -.0158245  .0419194  -0.377  0.706  -.097985  .066336
elf  I  .0000426  .0001934  0.220  0.826  -.0003365  .0004217
elf2  -1.88e-06  2.49e-06  -0.756  0.450  -6.76e-06  3.00e-06
elf2rf2  I  2.90e-10  2.09e-10  1.388  0.165  -1.19e-10  6.99e-10
logpop  I  -.0012297  .0010937  -1.124  0.261  -.0033733  .000914
cons  I  .026117  .0189044  1.382  0.167  -.0109351  .063169
--------- +-------------------------------------------------__----------------_
sigmau  I  0
sigma  e I  .02425737
rho  1  0  (fraction of variance  due to u_i)
predict  Plg
(option xb assumed;  fitted values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen ResPlg  =  Plg - ygll
(788 missing  values  generated)
xtreg  isxp  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll2  poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rf2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  516
Group  variable  (i) : id  Number  of groups  =  110
R-sq:  within  =  0.0299  Obs  per  group: min  =  1
between  = 0.9539  avg  =  4.7
overall  =  0.7519  max  =  5
Random  effects  u i - Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  - 1457.04
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0 (assumed)  Prob  > chi2  =  0.0000
isxp  I  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>Izl  [95% Conf.  Interval]
rgdpl2  1  9.37e-07  1.26e-06  0.747  0.455  -1.52e-06  3.40e-06
ygl2  .0847589  .1084281  0.782  0.434  -.1277562  .297274
poll2  -.0004517  .0004991  -0.905  0.365  -.00143  .0005265
poll2s  1  .0000549  .0001131  0.485  0.627  -.0001668  .0002766
geoper  I  -.0002895  .0003961  -0.731  0.465  -.0010659  .0004869
isxpll  I  1.015063  .0694173  14.623  0.000  .879008  1.151119
isxp2ll  -.3494425  .1037953  -3.367  0.001  -.5528775  -.1460074
elf  I  .0004362  .0004764  0.916  0.360  -.0004974  .0013699
elf2  -6.04e-06  6.15e-06  -0.982  0.326  -.0000181  6.01e-06
elf2rf2  1  5.87e-10  5.15e-10  1.140  0.254  -4.23e-10  1.60e-09
logpop  I  -.0049042  .0027029  -1.814  0.070  -.0102018  .0003934
cons  1  .0797931  .0467586  1.706  0.088  -.011852  .1714382
--------- +--------------------------------------------------__---------_______
sigma_u  I  0
sigma  e  I  .06206757
rho  1  0  (fraction  of variance  due  to u_i)
29. predict  Plx
(option xb assumed;  fitted values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen  ResPlx  =  Plx - isxp
(772 missing  values  generated)
. xtreg  isxp2  rgdpl2  ygl2  poll2  poll2s  geoper  isxpll  isxp2ll  elf  elf2  elf2rf-2
logpop,  re i(id)
Random-effects  GLS  regression  Number  of obs  =  516
Group  variable  (i)  : id  Number  of groups  =  110
R-sq:  within  =  0.0125  Obs  per  group: min  =  1
between  =  0.9292  avg  =  4.7
overall  =  0.6149  max=  5
Random  effects  u_i  - Gaussian  Wald  chi2(11)  783.94
corr(u_i,  X)  =  0  (assumed)  Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
isxp2  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>IZI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
rgdpl2  1  4.56e-07  9.57e-07  0.476  0.634  -1.42e-06  2.33e-06
ygl2  1  .1261093  .0826819  1.525  0.127  -.0359442  .2881628
poll2  1  -.0004413  .0003806  -1.159  0.246  -.0011872  .0003047
poll2s  1.18e-06  .0000863  0.014  0.989  -.0001679  .0001702
geoper  I  .0000172  .0003021  0.057  0.955  -.0005748  .0006093
isxpll  I  .2618684  .0529342  4.947  0.000  .1581193  .3656175
isxp2ll  .3393045  .0791492  4.287  0.000  .184175  .494434
elf  I  .0002471  .0003633  0.680  0.496  -.0004648  .0009591
elf2  I  -4.Ole-06  4.69e-06  -0.855  0.392  -.0000132  5.18e-06
elf2rf2  1  3.46e-10  3.93e-10  0.879  0.379  -4.25e-10  1.12e-09
logpop  I  -.0012051  .0020611  -0.585  0.559  -.0052448  .0028346




rho  I  0  (fraction  of variance  due to u_i)
. predict  Plx2
(option xb assumed;  fitted  values)
(772 missing  values  generated)
. gen ResPlx2  =  Plx2  - isxp2
(772 missing  values  generated)
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